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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the Plaintiff appeals 
from an award of attorney's fees and from an award of 
alimony, both awards having been made to the Defendant 
in the action below, Defendant not having by her pleadings 
and response to Plaintiff's Complaint requested attorney's 
fees or alimony, but where those responsi v·e pleadings 
were filed on the day of the trial and where in earlier 
proceedings the Court specifically reserved issues per-
taining to attorney's fees therein. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, by and 
through the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, heard this 
matter and awarded Respondent the sum of $1,500.00 for 
attorney's fees in connection with this matter and further 
awarded Respondent the sum of $150.00 per month for eighteen 
(18) months as alimony. The Court made other rulings which 
are not pertinent to this appeal, Appellant not having 
raised them in his brief (Brief of Appellant, Isaac Cruz, 
Page 3.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the order of 
the District Court awarding Respondent attorney's fees 
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and awarding them in the amount granted and further 
seeks affirmance of the Court's order requiring Plaintiff 
to pay the alimony to the Respondent and in the amount 
granted. Respondent further seeks attorney's fees for 
her response to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 13, 1978, Plaintiff filed 
his Verified Complaint against Defendant (R. 2-7) ·. There-
after, Respondent filed and served upon Plaintiff an 
Order to Show Cause and Restraining Order (R.14-15), 
Affidavit of Respondent (R.16-18) and Motion to Determine 
Temporary Custody (R.13). A hearing was held upon that 
matter before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court on December 22, 1978 
(Ro28-29). That matter involved the Appellant's taking 
of the minor child of the parties and refusing to allow 
Defendant to have any visitation whatever with the child 
or custody. In confirmance of the allegations made in 
Respondent's Affidavit in connection with her Order to 
Show Cause (R.16-18), the Court found, after having 
heard testimony of the parties and their witnesses and 
the arguments of counsel, that "the minor child of the 
parties was taken from the Defendant [Respondent] by the 
Plaintiff [Appellant] by threats of intimidation. 
(R.28) Respondent was successful in having the child 
-2-
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returned to her. The Court ordered, in connection 
therewith, "that there was no determination as to 
child support or attorney's fees, both issues being 
reserved for a future determination." (R-29}. That 
December 22nd date was the last available Court date 
prior to the Christmas holidays (R.220} and Respondent 
and her counsel were required to spend the entire day 
in Court in an attempt to get the matter heard. (R.220, 
223-225}. Respondent's attorney's fees for the conduct 
of this case through trial included the time and efforts 
expended on behalf of the Respondent (R.221} at the 
December 22nd hearing. 
Subsequently, on or about March 23, 1979, 
Respondent served upon Plaintiff an Order to Show Cause 
and supporting Affidavit (R.85-89} seeking, among other 
things, an award of alimony and an award of attorney's 
fees in connection with that particular action. The 
hearing on the matter was held April 4, 1979, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, and made its order in connection there-
with wherein Respondent was "required to pay to the 
Defendant, Michele Cruz, the sum of $300.00 per month 
as temporary alimony and support for the benefit of 
herself and her minor child during the pendency of this 
-3-
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action. It is understood that the Plaintiff, Isaac 
Cruz, is a teamster and is currently on strike. During 
the course of the strike that is underway at the date 
of this hearing Mr. Cruz shall be required to make 
payments of $100.00 per month during the course of the 
strike as a temporary child support and alimony payment 
to the Defendant. At such time as the strike is resolved 
Mr. Cruz shall immediately reinstate his payments at the 
amount of $300.00 per month, payable to the Defendant, 
Michele Cruz." (R.95). As to attorney's fees, the 
Court ordered that "determination of whether or not the 
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees for 
having to bring this action against the Plaintiff shall 
be reserved until the time of trial". (R.96). 
No responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Complaint 
had been filed through this date nor had any objections 
been made to that failure. On the day of trial and in 
open Court, a responsive pleading was filed to Plaintiff's 
Complaint (R.115), but which failed to request attorney's 
fees or alimony on behalf of Respondent although they had 
both been clearly in issue through the course of this matter 
as shown above and through contact with Plaintiff's counsel 
prior to the time of trial (R.223). 
-4-
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Trial was had in this matter on June 7, 1979, 
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court. Evidence was introduced at 
the trial in behalf of the Respondent regarding an award 
of alimony (R.201-240), an award of attorney's fees 
(R.220-225), and Respondent's due but unpaid amounts 
under the Order of Temporary Support in the amount of 
$500.00 (R.191-193; 199-200), the Appellant having paid 
only $200.00 under that prior order through the date of 
trial. 
The Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce on 
September 4, 1979 (R.131-139). On October 23, 1979, the 
Court heard the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (R.143) 
and on November 8, 1979, entered its Order denying that 
motion (R.145). Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO DEFENDANT 
OR IN THE AMOUNT AWARDED 
The Order appealed from regarding the alimony to 
Defendant ordered that "the Defendant is awarded $150.00 a 
month alimony for eighteen months, at which time, the alimony 
is to cease, in its entirety." (R.132). Substantial testimony 
-5-
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was elicited from each of the parties regarding their 
financial conditions at the time of trial (Plaintiff: 
R.170-176, 178-184, 199; Defendant: R.201-207, 209-211, 
216-217). Appellant in his brief does not appear to 
contest the amount of alimony awarded but rather that 
there was an award at all. Regardless of whether the 
amount of the award is in question, it appears that it 
is a matter that can readily be disposed of by this Court, 
should the Court decide that an award in this case is 
justified,by virtue of (a) the Appellant's failure to 
contest the size of the award in his Brief on Appeal, 
and (b) the various presumptions ordinarily applied to 
review of decisions of the lower court, namely, that 
this Court should not disturb the action of the District 
Court where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence 
to support the Court's action (Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 
499 (Utah 1976)), should review the decision below in a 
light most favorable to the prevailing Respondent in the 
case below (Nyman v. Cedar City, 361 P. 2d 1114, 12 U 2nd 45), 
and should not overturn the judgment below unless the 
Appellant is able to prove that the judgment is such a 
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court (Searle vs. Searle, 522 P.2d 
6 9 7 (Utah 19 7 4 ) ) . 
-6-
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The real question appears to be whether 
the Court should have made any award of alimony to 
the Defendant at all. The Appellant argues, through 
his counsel, that he was "mislead in this regard by 
the Defendant's failure to counterclaim or file an 
affirmative answer or in any manner request . . . 
alimony". (Brief of Appellant, Page 2). This case 
presents an unusual circumstance in that the responsive 
pleading was not filed until moments before the actual 
trial of the case. The Plaintiff's Complaint was signed 
and filed on November 13, 1978, and trial was held on 
June 7, 1979, a period of nearly seven months from date 
of filing to date of trial. During this period of time 
an award of temporary alimony was sought by the 
Defendant/Respondent and obtained for the pendency of 
this action as mentioned above. Prior to the trial, 
settlement attempts were made which included contact 
between the attorneys regarding payment of alimony to 
the Defendant, as also mentioned above. Thus, right 
up until the time of trial, the issue of alimony was, 
in a practical sense, still an open issue. Counsel 
for Plaintiff had failed throughout the pendency of 
this action to require Defendant to file a responsive 
pleading or to take advantage of her failure to do so. 
-7-
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Under those circumstances it might be said that Plaintiff 
waive his right to a timely notice of issues to be pre-
sented at trial, including the issues of alimony and 
attorney's fees. 
Additionally, there is the plain fact that 
counsel for Plaintiff represented the Plaintiff at the 
April 4, 1979, hearing wherein the Court specifically· 
reserved. the issue of an award of attorney's fees "until 
the time of trial" (R.96). Plaintiff was on clear and 
unambiguous notice that at the time of trial attorney's 
fees would be an issue in some degree yet, Appellant 
claims that the "Defendant refused to raise the issue 
of alimony or attorney's fees" and that the Plaintiff 
was "denied a full opportunity to meet this issue ... ". 
(Brief of Appellant, Page 3). He further asserts that 
"the Plaintiff had a right to assume and rely on the 
fact that the Defendant was not requesting ... attorney's 
fees. (Brief of Appellant, Page 3). 
Another aspect of Appellant's argument relates 
to the procedure of the presentation into evidence of 
the issue of alimony. The transcript relevant to this 
is as follows: 
Question: Is it your desire that Mr. Cruz 
pay alimony in a month for a 
period of time until you are able 
to regain some kind of stability 
economically for yourself? 
-8-
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Answer: Yes. 
Mr. Miner: Object to that question, 
your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which is substantially similar to the Federal Rules 
provides the manner of making an objection and the 
effect thereof. It states in sum that the party needs 
to both make known to the Court his objection and his 
grounds therefor. It is patent that no grounds for 
the objection whatever were asserted by Plaintiff. 
It is also apparent that the Plaintiff did have ample 
opportunity to object at the time the ruling was made 
so that his objection does not fall within the exception 
provided in Rule 46. Additionally, Rule 4(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "A verdict or 
finding shall not be set aside, nor shall a judgment 
or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) there appears 
of record objection to the evidence timely interposed 
and so stated as to make clear the specific grounds of 
the objection ... ". The objection was timely interposed 
but in no way made "clear the specific ground of objection." 
(See Magill v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., C.A. 3rd (1972) 
-9-
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404 
~ F.2d 294 to the effect that the Court of Appeals would 
not consider an argument based upon an objection to a 
question but which objection never set forth the ground 
urged on appeal for reversal; Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City vs. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47). Ergo, the 
Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complaint of the admission 
into evidence of the request for alimony regardles of 
the status of the pleadings and after admission into 
evidence properly became an issue in the case. 
The remaining question appears to be that of 
whether the award of alimony to a Defendant in a divorce 
action is proper in any event. Section 30-3-5(1), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides that when a 
decree of divorce is made "the Court may make such orders 
in relation to the parties, in the maintenance of 
the parties ••• as may be equitable." The statute makes 
no distinction between husband and wife or plaintiff and 
defendant but affirmatively requires the Court in a 
divorce action to review the circumstances of the parties 
and to enter an order based thereon as may be equitable. 
In this case, the Court below did review the circumstances 
of the parties and made an award that can certainly be 
considered equitable under the circumstances. The award 
was for a relatively small monthly amount over a strictly 
-10-
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limited and brief duration. The statute seems to 
imply on its face that regardless of the pleadings 
on both sides in a divorce action, the Court can 
enter whatever order it chooses as long as it is 
equitable and, presumably supported by the evidence. 
This would appear to leave open the possibility of 
both parties in a divorce action being unprepared 
to meet the issues the Court may find relevant in 
a divorce action. This statute substantially and 
specifically extends well beyond the provisions 
generally made for judgment as contained in Rule 54 
{c) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
seems to imply that relief can be given·only to 
one affirmatively requesting it. The divorce statute 
quoted specifically mandates, without reference to 
request for affirmative relief, that the Court review 
the circumstances of the party and enter a judgment 
that is "equitable". It appears, therefore, that a 
divorce action is a "heads up" ball game wherein the 
pleadings are not determinative in the action or at 
least have far less effect on the ultimate ruling of 
the Court than would be the case in all other types of 
actions. This interpretation seems to be confirmed 
by the provision~ of Section 30-3-3, U.C.A., wherein 
-11-
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it states that "The Court may order either party to pay 
to the clerk a sum of money for the separate support 
and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, 
and to enable such party to prosecute or defend the 
action." Again, this statute does not make reference 
to plaintiff and defendant or husband and wife. Given 
the foregoing, it appears that the Court did have power 
to enter its award or alimony. 
The conclusion that the Court was justified 
in making its award of alimony (and its award of attorney's 
fees) is further bolstered by the ruling of this Court 
in Palombi v. D and C Builders, 452 P.2nd 325, 22 Utah 2nd 
297 (1969) wherein the Court ruled that even though there 
was no request for an attorney's fee in the plaintiff's 
Complaint, because the action was governed by a statute, 
in this case lien statute, the statute in effect was 
incorporated by reference into the pleading and thereby 
justified the Court in awarding an attorney's fee. While 
the divorce statute is not so explicit as the lien statute 
involved in that case (Section 38-1-18, u.c.A., 1953), in 
a like manner it may, nevertheless, be incorporated into 
the pleadings of both parties to a divorce action and in 
this case specifically to support the awards given to the 
Respondent. 
-12-
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The Court, in the Palombi case, cautioned, 
however, that it was important that the issue be raised 
at some point in order to give the parties a full 
opportunity to meet it, which would presumably apply to 
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In the 
present case, however, it may not matter greatly whether 
or not the divorce statute is interpreted in the same 
manner as the lien statute, i.e., incorporating the 
terms of the statute into the pleadings of the parties 
by implicit reference. This is so because in the 
present case the specific issues complained of are the 
award of alimony and the award of attorney's fees. In 
both of these matters the Plaintiff had prior notice 
that these issues may or would be raised at the time 
of trial. Plaintiff did not complain at the time 
of trial that he was surprised by the issue of alimony 
{or the issue of attorney's fees), but rather could 
fairly assume over the pendency of the action that 
inasmuch as no responsive pleading had been filed it 
might be of issue at trial. 
It might be noted as well that in his brief 
Appellant states that he would have no objection to the 
award had the matter been pleaded and tried (Brief of 
Appellant, Page 2). It is submitted that Plaintiff 
-13-
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has made no case that an award granted to Defendant 
would be any different than that already entered by 
the Court nor to show that it is in any way inequitable. 
It might also be noted that Plaintiff was given full 
opportunity to examine or cross-examine the parties 
and other witnesses. 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits 
that the Court's award of alimony was properly granted 
in a reasonable amount and that the judgment of the 
Court should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO DEFENDANT OR IN THE AMOUNT 
GRANTED 
The Court will recognize that a substantial 
portion of the argument contained in Point I is applicable 
to Point II, the issue of the award of attorney's fees, and 
thus the arguments there will not generally be repeated. 
Counsel for the Respondent was sworn and testi-
fied without objection as to the December, 1978, Order to 
Show Cause and the April, 1979, Order to Show Cause and 
the trial in this matter (R.220-221). Specifically 
included in that testimony, again without objection, was 
testimony to the effect that the amount of attorney's 
-14-
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fees expended included "today's trial time" (R.221), 
i.e. the divorce trial. The testimony was to the 
effect that the Respondent's attorney's fees were 
incurred on an hourly basis (R.224) and that in 
excess of 25 hours had been expended in behalf of 
Respondent, including the one-half day in trial (R.131). 
The December 1978 hearing necessitated Respondent and 
her counsel to spend the entire day, the last court 
day before Christmas, in order to be heard in their 
attempts to regain custody of the Respondent's son 
(R.220), i.e. from 9:00 o'clock in the morning until 
5:00 p.m. that afternoon (R.224). Additionally, 
time was spent preparing the Order to Show Cause·, 
Temporary Restraining Order, the Affidavit and the 
Motion to Shorten Time in preparing the Order to Show 
Cause and Request for Temporary Alimony and Support 
in April of 1979, as well as discovery, correspondence 
and attempts to work out visitation and support between 
the parties (R.220-221). It is apparent from the 
record that a substantial amount of the time spent by 
the attorney for the Respondent, and therefore, the 
attorney's fees incurred, where in connection with 
matters specifically reserving the attorney's fees as 
an issue until trial. Unopposed and uncontroverted 
testimony was also given that the attorney's fees were 
reasonable (R.221). 
-15-
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It clearly appears that an undetermined but 
substantial portion of the attorney's fees awarded by 
the Court are completely justified as being awarded in 
relation to the earlier orders of the Court which held 
in abeyance until trial the issue of attorney's fees. 
Counsel for Plaintiff cross-examined Respondent's 
counsel on the issue of his attorney's fees, but did 
not inquire as to a breakdown of those fees, although 
the cross-examination was apparently of the scope 
desired by Plaintiff's counsel. (R.225). It should be 
noted that no objection had been raised to the intro-
duction of evidence regarding the attorney's fees in 
any manner. Therefore, the objections urged now on 
appeal that were not urged in the trial court should 
not be considered by the reviewing court in absence 
of a showing of any special circumstances why such 
objections were not made below (Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 
P.2d 1117, 10 U 2d. 159} and inasmuch as the Plaintiff 
had full opportunity to object he has not come within 
the exception provided in Rule 46, that if a party 
has no opportunity to object that the absence of an 
objection will not thereafter prejudice him. (Rule 46, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Hanks v. Christensen, 
354 P.2d 564, 11 U 2d. 8). In any event, the award 
-16-
• Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of attorney's fees has long been held by the Court to 
be a matter of discretion for the trial judge in a 
divorce case and that in absence of clear abuse of 
that discretion the Court's award will not be disturbed. 
(See for example, Bader v. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, 18 U.2d 
407 (1967); conversely see Alldredge v. Alldredge, 
229 P.2d 681, 119 U. 504 (1953)). 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits 
that the Court's award of attorney's fees was properly 
granted in a reasonable amount and that the judgment of 
the Court should be affirmed. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This case presents an unusual circumstance 
in that while a divorce was granted to the Plaintiff 
and no affirmative relief was sought in Respondent's 
pleadings, the Court, nevertheless, in granting the 
Plaintiff's divorce, awarded the Defendant alimony 
and attorney's fees. As to each the Plaintiff claims 
surprise because no affirmative relief was sought in 
the Respondent's pleadings below. Those pleadings 
were filed, however, on the day of trial, after a 
seven month pendency of the case before trial Respon-
dent additionally had been, in an earlier proceeding, 
awarded temporary alimony. Thus, a claim of surprise 
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does not appear well-founded. Utah law specifically 
allows such an award to be made absent affirmative 
requests in the pleadings, and finally, during the 
course of the trial, Plaintiff failed to appropriately 
object to the Respondent's request for attorney's fees. 
Even had that objection been properly made, however, 
the Court had within its discretion the power to make 
such an award and did so after a review of the circum-
stances of the parties. 
As to attorney's fees, it appears likewise 
that no timely objection was made or attempted regarding 
the issue of attorney's fees to be awarded to Respondent 
at trial of her action below. The record clearly shows 
that the issue of attorney's fees on two prior proceedings 
specifically reserved for the time of trial the issue 
of attorney's fees which prior hearings appear to 
represent a substantial portion of the attorney's fees 
granted even if Appellant was unjustly surprised by the 
attorney's fees issue. It thus appears that under the 
circumstances of this case under the statutes of the 
State of Utah cited, and under case law the Court in its 
discretion reasonably awarded alimony and attorney's fees 
to the Defendant and in reasonable amounts. The Order 
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of the Court below should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of 
March, 1980. 
HUNT, LAREW & KINATEDER 
~~ B~h'~ t)~ 
Hollis S .( Hunt 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr:C: 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
345 South State Street, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were served upon the 
Plaintiff/Appellant by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, to Mark s. Miner, Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 14th day of March, 1980. 
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